The UK COVID-19 report put the government’s pandemic response under scrutiny recently. Published by a cross-party committee, the report accused the government of failing to learn from the successful pandemic responses of other countries.

The House of Commons Health and Social Care, and Science and Technology Committee released a report on Monday 11 October shedding light on the UK’s COVID-19 pandemic response. The much called-for report on a period that has seen the UK government fall in popularity as government ministers were sacked for failing to step up to the challenge, has aroused renewed anger and resentment along the political spectrum and amongst the general public. 

The report, titled ‘Coronavirus: lessons learned to date’, alleges the government adopted a “fatalistic approach” to the pandemic, accepting “herd immunity” as an “inevitable outcome”, instead of “harnessing” its expertise in way of analysing data before and immediately after the pandemic affected the UK to implement strategies limiting virus transmission. 

However, a claim referenced throughout its report centres on the UK’s inability to learn from successful responses to the pandemic by countries closer to Wuhan, the Chinese province where the disease first appeared. Referring to South Korea’s approach, which built on from their response to the Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome outbreak in the country six years ago, the report alleged the UK government had failed to produce evidence that they had “formally studied” the approach before “rejecting” it. 

But what was South Korea’s response?

Unlike many other countries such as the UK, South Korea did not focus on stringent measures characterised by a series of lockdowns and restricting travel. An analysis of South Korea’s response, published on ‘Our World in Data’, divides it into three phases: detect, contain and treat. 

According to it, South Korea acted quickly in establishing the Korean Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) that used “virus specimens from China” to produce its testing capability. It took advantage of the “46 reforms” that the government made to their “health emergency preparedness and response”, by distance-screening and isolating those infected by covid-19 from the onset of the pandemic, and ensuring that treatment was proportionate to the severity of each individual case. 

It implemented measures that would prevent complacency within the public by identifying clusters of disease and targeting the strictest of its measures in covid-19 strongholds. Even as quarantine became a necessity for the infected when cases began rising to 200 a day in mid-March, the incentives to isolate were many. The government set up a tracing system to identify those who had travelled internationally or were otherwise suspected to be infected. They were required to use a self-quarantine safety protection app for a fortnight, to ensure quarantine was adhered to; punishment for defying the rule manifested in electronic wristbands given to track the violators location, and the imposition of a hefty fines of US$8217. 

‘Mental and physical support had been prioritised’

But the analysis by the group of scientists writing for ‘Our World Data’ noted that where people were to strictly isolate themselves if infected, mental and physical support had been prioritised. This support came as early as when the World Health Organisation had first been notified of the novel coronavirus.

Infection control extended to travel as the government limited the number of people coming into the country, but it also ensured that the country’s hospitals and community centres were staffed and equipped with sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE) to ensure the cases that did emerge were adequately dealt with. 

South Korea’s successful response was recognised by its medical staff. Speaking to the British Medical Journal, the president of the Korean Institute of Medical Education and Evaluation, Prof Ducksun Ahn said South Korea learned from its mistakes in dealing with the MERS outbreak: 

“It was very embarrassing. It created a great fear in society. With that fresh in their memories, people hearing of this new epidemic were anxious and so followed what the Government asked them to do,” said Prof Ahn.

‘We could have saved thousands of lives’

But that there was no shortage of PPE helped their response. “Koreans demanded to have N95 masks and they got them. They are still wearing it. They still do. That’s the norm,” said Professor Hyunmi Park, a colorectal consultant surgeon. 

She added: “If we had a heavy number of cases, like the UK, we probably couldn’t handle it either.” However, speaking to ITV after the publication of the UK’s covid-19 report, a member of the British Medical Association, Sakkaf Ahmed Aftab suggested the exponential rise in cases was due to inaction at the outset of the pandemic.

“If [the UK] had lockdown a week earlier, we could have saved thousands of lives. Our response was too slow,” he said. 

A response to the report echoed the comment.

Tessa Gregory, partner of Leigh Day, a major law firm in the UK that worked with NHS doctor and campaigner, Moosa Qureshi to release “reports detailing exercises simulating the NHS’ capacity to respond to a pandemic, said the following:

“It is difficult to understand why in the early days of the pandemic the government’s reaction was modelled on an outbreak of influenza, when, as our client has discovered through his transparency campaign, a pre-pandemic exercise (Exercise Alice) modelled on coronavirus had been carried out in 2016.”

The cross-party report implied a string of mistakes committed by the government, although it did highlight successful aspects of the response, including the vaccination rollout. But now, as the government decides against an enforcement of restrictions ahead of winter, whether the mistakes chronicled in this report prevent further chaos is yet to be seen.